

REFORMUK

SERVING THE CROWN

HOW A REFORM GOVERNMENT WILL CHANGE THE CAREERS, INCENTIVES AND CULTURE OF THE CIVIL SERVICE

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Summary

On the occurrence of a vacancy in the class above him he is promoted to fill it, as a matter of course, and without any regard to his previous services or his qualifications.

» Northcote and Trevelyan, 1854

People are promoted into quite senior roles without having experience in the subject.

» A serving civil servant, Reform UK Civil Service survey, 2026

» Whitehall has a skills and incentive problem, leading to an unproductive culture nobody chooses and no 'culture programme' can fix.
» We will break that chain by rebuilding the Civil Service career itself: how people join, how they are paid, how they are promoted and what they are trusted to do.
» We will reward officials who become experts and stay experts, instead of paying officials for switching departments and subject areas every year.
» Promotions will have to be earned: completed training, delivered results, time enough in the job to have learned it, and a professional examination passed on the way to Grade 7 and to the Senior Civil Service.
» Every department will be required to identify its worst-performing 10 per cent of staff each year. Those identified will face dismissal.
» Every priority will have one named owner, and officials at any grade will be able to bid to own a problem and be rewarded for fixing it.
» Ministers will be able to choose the senior officials who run their departments, from inside or outside the Civil Service, within clear rules.
» We will end the Civil Service Fast Stream as it works today. Recruitment will stay central, but fast streamers will be assigned to a home department and trained there for a career in a specific profession. There will still be a small leadership scheme run centrally.
» The highest performing civil servants will, in general, be better paid, but only on the basis of domain expertise and performance. Because there will be far fewer civil servants, the overall wage bill will still be far smaller than currently.

Introduction

Last October I said that a Reform government would be ready on day one. In December I set out the need for Whitehall to become much smaller, and what it costs the country to keep it unreformed. In May I set out how we will fix the centre of government: abolish the Cabinet Office, break up the Cabinet Secretary's job, create a new Office of the Prime Minister and a Department of the Civil Service, and give Secretaries of State the power to choose the people who run their departments and to move them on if the job is not being done.

Those papers were about power and structure. This one is about the people who staff it.

Let me begin with what we are not changing, because a great deal of nonsense is talked about this. Reform UK is not planning to 'politicise' the Civil Service. Appointment on merit through open competition will continue for the great majority of posts, including every post below the Senior Civil Service. But we want merit genuinely to mean the best person available for the job and not the best candidate who happens to be already in the system. What will change is who chooses the people at the top: ministers will in future be able to choose the senior officials who run their departments.

It is also worth setting out in a bit more detail what it means for a civil servant to serve the Crown, considering it seems to be widely misunderstood both within the Civil Service and outside of it. In the United Kingdom, sovereignty ultimately rests with 'the Crown in Parliament'. Ministers hold and exercise executive power on behalf of HM The King, but only by means of Parliament: either through legislation, or through their appointment by The King on the advice of a Prime Minister who enjoys the confidence of the House of Commons. This creates a chain of democratic authority: civil servants serve the Crown in Parliament, which is to say the government of the day. The Civil Service does not hold constitutional authority of its own. Civil servants are certainly not 'guardians of the constitution', as the current Cabinet Secretary styles herself.[1]

Our commitment therefore is to restore the principle set out by Robert Armstrong: "The civil service as such has no constitutional personality or responsibility separate from the duly elected Government of the day".[2] We are simply returning to a British settlement that the then-Cabinet Secretary himself set out in 1985 and that was the norm until very recently.

Ministers will get authority over the people who run their departments, including those currently in quangos, and will therefore lose their favourite excuse: to blame the Civil Service. They will be held to the highest standards, with a clear mandate and clear pledges for their first 100 days. Their officials will have the chance to become genuinely expert, to be paid accordingly, and to be given real responsibility for real problems. Taxpayers will get a government and a Civil Service that is very much smaller and a great deal better.

It all comes down to incentives

There have been many great reformers with big ideas to change the culture of Whitehall. Fulton in 1968. Next Steps in 1988. Francis Maude, twice, in 2012 and 2023. These are serious people who had serious proposals for how to fix the problems they correctly identified. But all their efforts share the same fate: they did not create lasting change. Culture cannot be externally fabricated and then added to an existing organisation. Culture is what happens when you set the right incentives and leave the machine running for many years.

So what are the incentives in Whitehall today? What behaviours do they reward? Consider how a talented official achieves a pay rise. An obvious career choice would be to invest time in building expertise in, for example, the tax code, or how to effectively govern a prison, or the intricacies of the licensing system for medicines. But there is little point to this: pay bands sit frozen at the minimum and internal promotions are rare, so there is no money in staying where you are.

However, there is money in leaving.

So our talented official applies for a job in a different team, in a different policy area, likely in a different part of government. To secure the promotion, all that is needed is a convincing demonstration of how he or she meets the generic Civil Service 'Behaviours' for the higher grade. At this point, their old team loses the person who was just beginning to understand the policy area. Their new team wins another generalist, now more senior on paper. Two years later our official does it again. By the time he or she reaches Grade 6, they have held many jobs and mastered none of them, and are managing people doing the same.

The Civil Service calls this a successful career. What they are actually doing is training generalists, systematically undervaluing operational and management capability compared to policy capability. Of course, briefing, clearance and private office skills are real, but without subject expertise they can only produce process, not results. Many make it all the way to the top this way, partially explaining why we have ended up with such poor senior leadership in today's Civil Service. And, importantly, this system is doing great injustice to young people in particular, who frequently find their process skills count for little outside the Civil Service.

And if they dared to choose differently and became a genuine expert? Then the reward for producing genuinely outstanding work in a specialist field is, very often, a supermarket voucher for a hundred pounds.[3] It is almost never a promotion, and it cannot be a pay rise. In the warped Civil Service system, it is effectively career sabotage.

None of this is a theory or an outside assessment. It is what officials currently working in the Civil Service told us. Reform UK remains the only party that has asked civil servants to anonymously share their real views.[4] What came back was not just a complaint about pay. It was a complaint about a system that is ineffective, wasting taxpayers' money, and driving the most talented officials away.

We heard from an official in the Foreign Office that knowledge of particular countries and regions "exists in the FCDO, but is not valued enough – subject matter experts are prevented from being promoted to a senior level". Another spoke about the doctrine behind it: "the generalist ethos assumes a baseline of capability of its staff across all functions, i.e. anyone can do any job. Nonsense". We also heard that "staff are barely managed, there is no mentorship, no effort to identify talent and no means of putting people on individual career pathways".

On recruitment, an official in HMRC wrote that the hiring system "rewards those who can spin a good story" and that "working class colleagues don't stand a chance". And on responsibility, an official in the MoD told us: "people are incapable of decision making and always deferring upwards, changing their decision to that of the highest ranked person in the room. Challenging this orthodoxy is career suicide".

No ambitious civil servant would ever choose to work in such a system. It is the result of a perverse set of incentives. But neither this government, nor the last one, nor the Civil Service's woefully underskilled leadership, who owe their careers to it, have shown any serious intention of changing this system.

Why previous attempts have failed

There have been attempts to cut the size of the Civil Service before. At the time of the 2010 spending review the Civil Service employed 478,130 FTE staff. By June 2016, the month of the Brexit referendum, that had fallen to 384,230. This was the smallest the organisation had been since the Second World War, and a reduction of almost a hundred thousand posts. Today it stands at 523,185. Every single post was put back, and 45,000 added on top.

Regrettably, however, more staff has not meant better productivity. The ever-widening, unaddressed gap between public and private sector productivity growth since 2019, across the entire public sector, now costs Britain around £80bn a year in lost economic output.[5]

This current situation is the result of short-sighted programmes to cut headcount but change nothing else. The Coalition did remove posts. But it left untouched all that produced them in the first place: low productivity, a career model in which the only way to be paid more is to frequently switch roles and get promoted, and the practice of poor performers always being recycled, never exited. So when Theresa May became Prime Minister and removed all remaining pressure to rationalise, the Civil Service regrew at a rapid pace.

Numbers are only the symptom. Ignore the causes and you will be back in the same place ten years on, having spent time and energy fighting the blob and getting nothing for it.

The rest of this paper sets out Reform UK's proposals to change the incentives in the system, so that in future Whitehall delivers for the government and the public.

Pay and bonuses

We will run the country with a substantially smaller civil service and pay high-performing civil servants more. The current settlement, an enormous but moderately paid workforce on fixed salaries, is broken. It does not suit the taxpayer, who pays for a great many individuals but does not get anything close to good administration in return. It does not suit the excellent official, who watches underperforming colleagues take home the exact same salary for a fraction of the impact. It suits exactly one type of person: the civil servant who has worked out that very little is actually required of them to take home their taxpayer-funded salary, that no one will ever dismiss them and that if they sit around long enough they will retire on a generous pension at roughly the same level as their previous income. Plus the full state pension, naturally.

Under Reform UK, it will be possible again to have a successful career in the Civil Service by becoming genuinely expert in an area of government. We know that cannot simply be decreed. It requires changing what the government pays for. Over the last few months, in close consultation with experts and serving officials, we have identified the measures we believe will achieve the change we seek.

Firstly, **we are reintroducing pay band progression, so that an official can be paid more for doing the same job better.** Progression will not be automatic and will not be based on time served; that system was rightly abolished a decade ago. Instead, it will be based on an assessment of performance, completed training and demonstrated expertise.

Secondly, **we will introduce 'trade supplements' across the Civil Service.** As already happens in some limited areas, officials holding critical skills which the Civil Service struggles to attract and retain will be able to receive a supplement on top of their pay. This will ensure that departments can hold these colleagues without having to promote them out of the position and grade they are excelling at.

Thirdly, **we will fundamentally transform how bonuses work in the Civil Service, and are committed to increasing the bonus pool to £500 million initially, open to every grade including the most junior.** Right now, the bonus pot across the entire Civil Service is around £100 million. Spread across more than half a million people, we get to around £190 a head. This is why outstanding work is routinely rewarded with a £100 supermarket voucher, which we know from officials is perceived as more of an insult than a token of appreciation. £500m instead means around £1,000 for every official on today's numbers, and significantly more as the organisation gets smaller. Not everyone will receive this, in fact most will not. But those who do receive a bonus will receive a generous one. For the first time it will be worth going the extra mile.

Bonuses will go to individuals and small teams. We recognise much of the Civil Service's work happens in teams and that a reward system that exclusively rewards individuals creates friction. Where output is genuinely hard to measure, as in some policy work, we will reward the timely implementation of major projects, alongside smaller regular awards for completing specific pieces of work. Departments can also keep and use a share of what they save by adopting AI and use it for bonuses, incentivising the use of new technology. Robert Jenrick has already set out plans to link Treasury ministers' and officials' pay to growth in GDP per person. Likewise, we will examine linking the size of the bonus pool to national economic growth or public sector productivity, so that the Civil Service has a direct stake in delivering better output.

Our changes, taken together, will amount to a new contract between the Crown and those who serve it. Pay that rises with proven performance and expertise, in return for a more modest pension and an end to the job for life system regardless of performance. Pension rights already earned will be fully protected. New joiners will be on these terms by default; existing staff will be able to choose them. We believe this will do far more to attract today's

high performers to the Civil Service than an outdated pension model the private sector abandoned decades ago and whose primary beneficiaries are those who 'wait it out' until retirement.

None of this requires new money over the course of the Parliament. The one-off cost of exits will offset savings in the first year, as I set out in December. From the second year onwards, £500m on bonuses is a small part of the savings that will be made on staffing costs, handed straight back to the people who stay and work hard. Pension reform will also carry a moderate cost in the early years, as contributions fall while existing pensions must still be paid, but that too is covered by the savings from a smaller workforce. Our reforms will also steadily reduce the liabilities we would otherwise leave to future generations. Going forward, the smaller the organisation becomes, the more there is to pay in salaries to those who stay.

Career planning

Under a Reform government, promotion to Grade 7 (~£63,000 annually), and entry to the Senior Civil Service, will have to be earned. **We will introduce four basic requirements: completed training relevant to the job; a minimum period in grade; a professional examination passed; and a record of results delivered in previous roles.** The first used to be, and the second still is, required in the Foreign Office, so we expect to roll them out across Whitehall quickly. The cumulative effect of these measures is to end the current open-door policy that allows generalists to jump between departments and policy areas thanks to standardised forms of recruiting. Instead, we want to restore promotion as a substantial reward for those who have put in the hours to build the expertise and knowledge required to lead.

Of the four measures, the new examination scheme is the most significant change. To be clear: we are not planning a return to the old 'Method I' examinations. A single centralised examination for the whole of Whitehall, testing general knowledge about government, rewards only those who excel at learning content by heart. It changes nothing.

Instead, the new examinations will be tailored to departments. Departments will test an applicant's understanding of the law or the functions and purpose of their department. For instance, the Department for Education may require an official to demonstrate an advanced understanding of the funding model of the English school system; the Ministry of Defence working knowledge of the structure of our Armed Forces. A minimum standard for those tests will be set by the Department of the Civil Service. A pass does not guarantee promotion; a fail prevents it.

The same examination will need to be sat by those at Grade 7 or higher moving between government departments. The aim is simple: to secure a baseline of knowledge among those who lead, to raise the bar for switching departments on a whim, and to encourage people to excel in one area of government and seek their promotion there.

Rewarding performance, ending failure

Today, civil servants are assessed against fixed, pre-written standards, and almost everyone meets them. At the Department of Health and Social Care, fewer than 10 of the almost 3,000 end-of-year ratings for delegated grades were 'unsatisfactory' in 2024/25. At the medicines regulator, not a single member of staff was sacked because of an unsatisfactory rating in five years.[6] We know from serving officials in these departments that these numbers bear no relation to reality. They tell us performance management in the Civil Service is broken: when everyone is rated as performing or better, it tells managers and ministers nothing, it rewards no one for success and it prevents evidence of failure from being recorded. It is deeply unfair.

A Reform government, through the new Department of the Civil Service, will therefore set every department a mandatory target: each year, it must identify the worst-performing 10 per cent of its staff. The precise ranking will be for them to decide, but the target will not be optional. High performers will gain access to additional rewards, while those in the bottom 10 per cent will receive a 'yellow card' and three months on a formal improvement plan. Those who fail to improve, or who receive a second 'yellow card' the following year, will be shown the 'red card' and dismissed on grounds of capability. The Department of the Civil Service will monitor how each department meets the target.

At the same time, we will change the incentives for line managers. In the rare cases it is attempted, exiting a poor performer in today's Civil Service is arduous: it takes months of process and written evidence, grievances and the threat of a tribunal. Senior managers therefore almost always prefer moving underperformers to so-called 'talent pools', or arranging a direct managed move somewhere else. Civil servants tell us that routinely these moves even include a promotion in order to further smooth the process and avoid any potential for conflict. There are only upsides to this for the manager: the taxpayer will pick up the bill and the official is moved on swiftly.

A Reform government will not allow the recycling of failed officials to continue. We will abolish 'talent pools'. Every official who receives a 'red card' will be processed for dismissal on grounds of capability, and a dedicated team will take each case through to its conclusion. We will also require every future change of role to be supported by a reference from the current line manager, and managers will themselves be assessed on how they handle poor performance in their team.

We do not intend to return to the flawed ranking system introduced in 2012 and then abandoned in 2019. The reforms introduced by Maude sorted staff into boxes but changed little else. Pay stayed frozen, progression stayed closed and poor performers were still recycled rather than exited. Even today, senior civil servants are expected to rate around 5 per cent of their colleagues as underperforming, yet this results in virtually no consequences. Identifying failure is not enough. Under Reform, performance management is integral to decisions on who receives pay band progression and a share of the new £500 million bonus pool. It is also part of our wider strategy to fairly and quickly bring down the numbers of civil servants.

Ownership and accountability

Money is not all that drives people. Our survey gave us strong evidence that pay is only one of the areas officials are deeply frustrated about. To a large degree they also feel prevented from making a difference. They describe a total lack of accountability across the organisation: clearance processes run by people with no knowledge of the subject, job descriptions and personal objectives that are entirely generic, committees and managers who push decisions upwards until the last trace of individual ownership is erased. Such a system can only produce one outcome: personal failure always ends up being systemic failure, and no one is ever personally responsible.

So the second half of our offer is to give more authority to capable officials.

Every priority of a Reform government will have one named person who owns it. Not a board, not a programme, not a senior responsible owner ('SRO') who owns ten other policies. We want a single person, in control of a budget and a team. The corporate functions such as HR, finance, commercial or legal act as expert advisers to them during the life of the project, rather than being blockers further down the road.

Some priorities will cross departmental lines, although under a Reform government there will be fewer such cases with fewer departments. Where a priority does cross departments, its named owner will lead a team drawn from each department involved, with a single budget to which each contributes, held by one lead department whose accounting officer answers for it, and a clear agreement at the outset on what each party will provide. The Office of the Prime Minister will monitor progress and step in where none is made.

This kind of ownership will be the lived experience at every level. Many officials in the junior grades are highly motivated and talented, but are generally ignored by the generalists in charge. Under Reform UK, officials at any grade will be able to bid to own a defined problem, and the ones who fix it will be rewarded for it. A junior official who spots the potential for efficiency savings or fraud reduction in their area will be given the time and authority to explore their solution, and receive a share of what they save.

We want this principle to apply to every job. Job descriptions in the Civil Service today are written in abstract terms, such as 'engagement with stakeholders', which make it virtually impossible for a line manager to prove that someone is not doing their job, and very easy for the official to prove that they are. Under a Reform government, no one will be recruited into a generic 'Policy Adviser' or 'Stakeholder Manager' role. The manager will have to write down exactly what the job entails and how performance in it will be assessed. That is fairer to those officials who take their job seriously, and it will establish a clear foundation for dealing with poor performance.

The principle will extend to how departments are organised in future. Today, decisions pass through a baroque cascade of instructions: from ministers, to policy leads, to operations teams, to digital teams, and often on to private sector contractors. Time and accountability is lost at every step. As a Reform government reorganises Whitehall from first principles, we will organise departments around the services they provide rather than professional functions. Only a few specialist professions, such as law, procurement and HR, will be organised separately. The operating principle of government should be delivering a valuable service to the public, not policy announcement.

Nowhere does this matter more than in the services the public deals with directly. Tens of thousands of civil servants work in contact centres and on casework, and too often the public waits far too long for a call to be answered or an application to be decided. AI will fundamentally transform this work but it is likely to increase demand for it too. We want a government that answers faster, decides applications more quickly, and resolves problems swiftly where they arise. That needs better technology and far fewer, more highly skilled, and better paid staff. We will begin this transformation process with trials in selected services.

Each department's priorities will be set out in a short, published plan. Whitehall has had three systems of departmental plans since 2010: business plans, single departmental plans and outcome delivery plans. The most recent have not even been published. They have failed mainly because they list too many priorities and often name outcomes over which the department has little control. A Reform government's plan will name a small number of critical priorities, with named owners and a budget and measures that they can genuinely influence, alongside wider outcomes. The Office of the Prime Minister will track progress.

Lastly, we want to significantly increase transparency of what is being delivered by government departments. Civil servants are ultimately funded by taxpayers. Taxpayers therefore have a right to understand what directorates and teams in government departments do for the public, and how well they perform.

The way in

We will end the Civil Service Fast Stream as it works today.

The scheme we have now produces the exact opposite of what we need. We push bright graduates through a series of short postings in unrelated fields and in various government departments, then promote them to Grade 7 after roughly three years. What the Cabinet Office has created and is centrally coordinating is in essence a supercharged version of the generalist career explained earlier in this article. It pushes large numbers of young people with too little real expertise into senior positions early, perpetuating the existing problem.

Our new model is broadly based on how the Armed Forces recruit. The only part of the Fast Stream that will remain central, with the Department of the Civil Service, is recruitment. We recognise the Fast Stream is a strong brand, and a central process is currently the only way to ensure all applicants are assessed to the same high standards. However, much like an officer who is commissioned into a regiment, those who are successful will then be assigned to a permanent home department to be trained for 3 years. This will be on the basis of their preferences, the strengths they have demonstrated, and the government's needs. The practice of taxpayers paying for people to take a tour of Whitehall departments will end: being a fast streamer will mean a commitment to one department and building strong expertise in a specific area, with the possibility of becoming a future leader. In return, departments will closely support their fast streamers and ensure they gain highly valuable operational and management experience, not just policy drafting skills.

However, we are well aware of the ideological capture of departmental HR teams and the dangers this poses for Fast Stream cohorts managed by departments. This is why initial recruitment has to remain central for now. Today, Civil Service HR staff are expected to hold highly controversial accreditation from the Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development, a body accused by HR leaders and former members of prioritising 'culture war topics' over the practical work of HR.[7, 8] It expects members to "role-model and advocate the value of including others and embracing difference".[9] As I have repeatedly pointed out, a civil servant's duty is impartiality, not advocacy. The DCS will ensure that this accreditation is no longer expected of anyone working in Civil Service HR. Our actions will guarantee that the next generation of leaders is chosen for its judgement and skills rather than any 'identity' criteria.

We will also not repeat the mistakes of 2022 when the Fast Stream was paused at short notice to help meet a headcount target and the decision was reversed within six months. We are not pausing anything. The new route will open on the day the old one closes.

Alongside this, the Department of the Civil Service will run a small, separate leadership scheme of its own, a few dozen places a year, open to people of all ages who can demonstrate truly exceptional capability, whatever their background.

Leading departments

Under a Reform government, Secretaries of State will appoint the permanent heads of their departments, with the Prime Minister's consent, for fixed terms of up to five years, in line with the five-year terms on which permanent secretaries are already appointed. Ministers will also be able to appoint people to the Senior Civil Service in their departments personally, from inside or outside the Civil Service, and to end those appointments. Every appointment made through this route will be published. Importantly, permanent secretaries are also accounting officers, answerable to Parliament for public money. Removal will not silence them: those removed by a Secretary of State will be free to explain themselves to the Public Accounts Committee. As previously announced, we will legislate for this.

This is about expertise and delivery, not party. In choosing a senior official, a minister is entitled to look for the knowledge to do the job and a commitment to delivering the programme the government was elected on. Membership or support of a political party will not be a requirement. These officials will be bound by the Civil Service Code, including its requirement of political impartiality: to serve governments of different political persuasions equally well, and to take no part in political activity incompatible with their post.

The Department of the Civil Service

All of the above needs strong leadership to do it, which is the job of the new Department of the Civil Service which I announced earlier this year.

The DCS will be led by a CEO recruited from outside the Civil Service, with real experience of turning round a large organisation. We have already begun our search. The CEO will report directly to the Prime Minister, who remains Minister for the Civil Service. The DCS and its CEO will own the headcount rationalisation programme, the pay and promotion framework, the adoption of AI across government, the standards for procurement, and the shared services that departments should not each be duplicating. The CEO will also assist ministers with ensuring every department has the management expertise needed to run effectively, brought in from outside if necessary.

To make this real, every department will have a small change team, appointed from outside the Civil Service on a fixed term, with expertise in HR, finance and commercial work. Its members will be senior civil servants with real authority, appointed by the Secretary of State, whose explicit job is to use their experience to direct the people below them in a hands-on way, and to set out what good performance looks like in the department's key roles. Once a department's new ways of working are established, their job is done, and the DCS will ensure standards do not slip again.

While the DCS naturally takes on some corporate functions from the Cabinet Office where these cannot return to departments, it is not a replacement for it. We know all too well what happens when the centre is allowed to grow. In 2012 Francis Maude rightly brought Civil Service training into a single contract instead of each department buying its own courses. By 2015, the Cabinet Office reported savings of £89 million. But the central teams managing these contracts kept growing, and the contracts became so large that no challenger could realistically compete. In 2024 the existing contracts with KPMG and EY were extended by almost £150 million rather than re-competed. So the DCS will be organised around a number of core functions and projects with defined targets. Where these are achieved, people either move on or return to other departments. We want the DCS to lead by example as the first department fully running on new terms, with pay, bonuses and promotions following the framework set out in this article.

Conclusion

Britain's Civil Service was once the envy of the world, and a great many of the people in it are still exceptional. I have met many of them and Reform UK's Civil Service survey is full of them. They are not the obstacle. They are precisely why we need a smaller, better paid organisation.

We will put an end to a deeply unfair and unproductive system in which the best official and the worst official can receive the same money, the same treatment and have the same prospects; in which the safest route to promotion is to leave the job before anyone can tell whether you were any good at it.

What we are offering instead is a Civil Service which rewards skill and subject expertise: where proven delivery, not demonstrated 'Behaviours', is how you get on and where working for the Crown is understood as a privilege that comes with serious obligations but also serious opportunities for those who excel in their roles.

I said last December that 'beyond the storm, there is sunshine'. For the excellent civil servants of today and tomorrow: this is what it looks like.

We are continuing to gather evidence from serving and former officials. Please tell us what you think about our proposals, what it would take to keep you performing at your best, and what you would fix if somebody gave you the authority to fix it. You can send us a message through this contact form in complete confidence: anonymously if you prefer, or with a personal email address if you are happy for us to follow up.

Endnotes

1 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/cabinet-secretarys-objectives-2026-27
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9 CIPD Profession Map, 'Working inclusively': https://www.cipd.org/uk/the-people-profession/the-profession-map/explore-the-profession-map/core-behaviours/working-inclusively

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